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1.  Introduction 
Government policy failure is more frequent now than it used to be, it seems, and more 
precarious for those who are responsible. Policy outcomes have become very difficult 
to predict as a result of developments in society at large and in the political realm in 
particular. Government authority is increasingly challenged, traditional policy 
instruments (legislation, financial incentives) have lost much of their power, and 
policy making has to take a steadily growing number of complex policy networks into 
account. As a result of this prediction problem, many policy measures fail to produce 
the goals set in advance, or produce undesired outcomes, or both. The problem of 
prediction is still aggravated by government’s high ambitions (welfare state, 
safeguarding economic growth), and by the increase of political interdependencies, as 
the single example of EMU may already demonstrate.  
When policy failure is likely to have repercussions for government officials who are 
responsible, poor predictability of policy outcomes is likely to be perceived as a source 
of risk. This perception of risk seems to increase, in most countries, if only because of 
broad media exposure of policy failure that may soon require measures to be taken for 
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the sake of government credibility. The present large numbers of extraparliamentary 
committees, independent reports, consultancy firm engagements, or implementation by 
a commercial or a ‘hybrid’ third party are not surprising, then, since these are ways to 
find shelter. Neither surprising is the recurrent practice of politicians passing the buck 
by leaving legislative activities to judges (Montesquieu would turn in his grave). And 
finally, the rise of ‘interactive policy making’ and ‘network management’ is not 
surprising. These latter phenomena reflect recent theoretical insights in the nature of 
policy processes, we admit, but they also serve the purpose of ‘sharing responsibility’, 
thus reducing the vulnerability of government actors. 
Such attempts to obviate forseeable consequences of policy failure can be viewed as 
one strategy to deal with the problem of poor predictability of policy outcomes. 
Another is rash decision making, which means that at least a policy maker cannot be 
blamed for ‘doing nothing’. Still another is the creation of separate domains of policy 
making, a strategy that may be convenient for actors facing a degree of complexity they 
cannot handle, but also for actors who have a clear solution in mind for some policy issue, 
a solution they do not want to be diluted (as they see it) in a process of either joint or 
‘integral’ decision making. Finally, relying to procedures (in the stages of both policy 
making and implementation) is also a strategy, perhaps even the most widespread one. 
The administrative views underlying these strategies are divergent, and risk-
avoidance is not always the only motive (if a conscious motive at all). Still, these 
strategies have in common that they are ways to evade addressing the problem of 
adequate prediction of policy outcomes. Rather than exploring the use or the 
implications of these strategies, we will present social simulation as an instrument for 
ex ante assessment of new policy, administrative reform in particular. 
The point is not that social simulation allows very accurate prediction of policy 
outcomes (though that may also be the case, especially when outcomes are conceived 
of in terms of behavioral patterns instead of behavioral manifestations), but that it 
nurtures the process of policy making, offering evidence and experiences that allow 
actors to face the problem of outcomes that are difficult to predict. Thus, rather than 
suggesting that social simulation renders policy outcomes fully transparent and 
predictable, we will argue that participating in a social simulation, observing the 
processes to evolve, and thoroughly discussing the views and experiences of 
participants and observers will contribute to learning about the range of possible 
outcomes of a projected policy. In short, in this paper it is defended that social 
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simulation can provide policy makers with other (and better) options than risk 
avoidance, shrinking the playing field, legalism, or simply cutting the knot. 
2.  A polycentric conception of policy processes 
It is not a novel insight that policy processes get more complex, and outcomes more 
difficult to predict, if more (groups of) people are involved in decision making and 
implementation. Fairly new, however, is the view that these (groups of) involved 
people can be seen as actors who do contribute to the policy process, and not merely as 
subjects to be (re)directed and controlled by ‘the’ policy maker. 
Quinn (1978) offers an idealtypical description of the old view, which he calls 
“formal systems planning approach”. The approach includes such steps as analyzing 
one’s internal situation, projecting current needs and resources to the future, analyzing 
opportunities and threats in the market, establishing broad goals as targets for 
subordinate groups’ plans, identifying the gap between expected and desired results, 
communicating planning assumptions, requesting plans from subordinate groups with 
more specific goals, needs, and actions. Occasionally, special studies of alternatives, 
contingencies, or longer-term opportunities will be necessary. Reviewing and approving 
divisional plans is always part of the approach, and so is the development of long-term 
budgets related to plans, the implementation of plans, and the monitoring and evaluation 
of performance. 
While the description pertains to ‘strategic’ tasks in commercial organizations, it 
serves well to characterize the ‘rational’ approach to policy making in the public 
sector. Over the years, this ‘rational’ approach has been criticized for misrepresenting 
the way decisions are really made. According to Simon, people have to act on the basis 
of incomplete information, have no overall view of alternatives, and are unable to 
balance possible outcomes (Simon 1957, March & Simon 1958; see also Morgan 1986, 
Kickert 1988). Moreover, Lindblom (1959) has argued that decision making is a 
political process in which goals are not unequivocal, sometimes conflicting, and not 
stable over time. And since the implications of a radically new policy are difficult to 
predict, Lindblom adds, decision makers tend to stay close to the policies they are 
acquainted with.  
Note that a normative model (as Quinn claims the formal systems planning 
approach to be) is contested here on empirical grounds. An often repeated argument in 
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defence of the ‘rational model’ is that prescription and description are separate 
domains, and that empirical evidence cannot, for that reason, invalidate a normative 
approach. It is rather peculiar, however, when a prescription continues to complied 
with even though it is known to involve requirements that cannot be met. Moreover, if 
empirical research shows that a normative model fails to produce the results it claims 
to deliver (Witte, 1972), the model deserves no privileged position. 
From this point on two diverging traditions, broadly speaking, have evolved. A first 
attempts to save the ‘rational model’ by changing elements so that important 
objections are met. Examples are ‘mixed scanning’ (Etzioni 1967) and ‘logical 
incrementalism’ (Quinn 1978, 1982). In political science, the conception of the policy 
process as consisting of a number of more or less separate activities (agenda building, 
policy design, decision making, implementation, maintenance, evaluation, feedback) 
also seems to serve this purpose. 
The approaches or normative theories of this first tradition share the assumption that 
policy is made by a particular category of people, called policy makers. Precisely this 
assumption is not made in the second tradition. Mayntz (1976) argues that decision 
making in organizations often involves several actors, which means that “processes of 
exercising influence in interactive situations” must be studied rather than individuals’ 
cognitions. She also emphasizes that the distinction made in the ‘rational model’ 
between goals and means - a distinction that is often supposed to be connected with 
different hierarchical levels - does not exist in reality. A ‘dialogue model’ is proposed 
instead, that is “a complex model of an iterative process where the directives coming 
from the top are informed by the perceptions of problems, possible solutions, and 
situational constraints coming from below, and where these directives in turn structure 
perceptions and the search for solutions at the section level.” 
As ‘dialogue’ means ‘thinking together’ (Senge 1990), the model proposed by 
Mayntz emphasizes a consensual approach to decision making. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, in contrast, assume value conflict to exist between ‘advocacy coalitions’ that 
involve actors from multiple government levels and agencies as well as interest group 
members and researchers (Sabatier & Zafonte 1995). 
Both proposals, whether suggesting ‘just’ dialogue or no less than a professional/ 
scientific forum as a way to arrive at consensus, assume that organizations and 
organizational networks (private and public alike) are fields of tension, as a result of 
the different perceptions and problem definitions held and the different judgements 
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made by the various (interest) groups or stakeholders involved. Accordingly, the 
picture of government as a monocentric, monorational actor has to be abandoned, in 
favour of a ‘polycentric’ conception of policy processes, and in favour of the notion of 
multiple rationalities (Bekke, Kickert & Kooiman 1995).  
By the word ‘polycentrism’ it is stressed that policy processes are shaped by many 
actors. No single actor, including government, has full control over the course or 
outcomes of a policy process. And the picture is even more complicated than that, as 
government itself can be seen as a collection of different, sometimes even competing 
actors (Smith 1981).  
This ‘polycentric’ conception of policy processes gives rise to questions that are 
considerably different from the questions that follow from a ‘rational’ view of policy 
making. For illustration, recall the formal systems planning approach. The first 
question asked concerns analysis of one’s internal situation. Given a ‘monocentric’ 
view, such an analysis may produce an unequivocal picture of the state of the art, but 
given a ‘polycentric’ view it is likely to reveal a variety of group-related perceptions and 
judgements (Vissers 1994). Thus taken, the question shifts from ‘analysis of one’s 
internal situation’ to ‘investigation of various stakeholders’ perceptions and problem 
definitions’.  
A similar shift of focus will be found with other subjects, like ‘current needs’, 
‘future resources’, ‘opportunities and threats in the market’, and, very conspicuous, 
‘goals to be set’. The main question, then, is how to act in the midst of different and 
sometimes contrasting perceptions (which comes very close to Sabatier and Zafonte’s 
main question).  
Actors (to be sure, any of the stakeholders in a policy process) still can resort to an 
instrumental approach, asking themselves: How can I design and communicate plans 
in order to get the responses that meet my objectives? Very different is the course of 
action that can be designated as ‘interactive’, ‘facilitating’, or ‘responsive’ (Mastik, 
Scalzo, Termeer & In ’t Veld 1996). Now, the quality of the decision-making process 
(and the quality of the policy process in general) becomes the subject of prime 
concern. It is this interactive approach that is beginning to find broad recognition in 
public administration (Pröpper & Steenbreek 1998). 
Whether an instrumental or a responsive/interactive approach is being pursued, the 
task of dealing with different views and perceptions is a challenging one, in the 
context of public policy. It requires knowledge of process dynamics: What interaction 
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processes will emerge, and how can they be understood, facilitated, and re directed? 
And what is the part played by the initial policy plan or statement? However, these are 
straightforward questions (though difficult enough from a researcher’s viewpoint) as 
compared to delicate issues like when to re direct (and on what grounds), and whom to 
grant participation in the process (and in which part of it). Also intricate is the question 
of evaluation: In what terms can the process and its outcomes be evaluated, given that 
evaluation criteria shared by all stakeholders will be hard to find? 
3.  Reasons for ex ante assessment of reform in public administration 
Actors involved in public administration may find it of limited help to observe that 
policy processes take place in polycentric networks. For such actors, practical 
conclusions and indications of policy or conduct may be relevant, rather than analysis 
itself. What is, in other words, a sensible course of action given that policy domains 
have become very complex because of the increasing numbers of ‘external actors’ 
seeking to influence the policy process and its outcomes? Answers, but always 
provisional answers, can be derived from others’ experiences (say, in ‘the literature’), 
or from own experiences. 
With regard to ‘others’ experiences’, practitioners in the field of public policy may 
take advantage from the large and growing literature on subjects like interactive policy 
making, participatory policy analysis, co production in the public sector, or network 
management (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). This branch of work, often 
explicitly referring to a ‘polycentric’ conception of policy processes, comprises both 
comparative analyses and case studies. There is much that can be learned from it. 
Proper benchmarks (Ammons 1999) and well-documented success stories and failures 
can be highly instructive. Still, if it comes to adopt a course of action it seems sensible 
not to rely heavily on others’ experiences, either in ‘the literature’ or provided by an 
adviser. The reason is that others’ experiences cannot compensate for direct (or ‘own’) 
experience. But why is direct experience important? 
Brown, Collins & Duguid (1989), defending the concept of situated knowledge, 
argue that ‘the constituent parts of knowledge’ index the world and are therefore, 
necessarily, a product of the activities and situations in which they are produced. This 
means that ideas, suggestions, theories that derive from others’ experiences do not 
apply automatically to a new situation: they have to be ‘made fit’. But this is an 
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uncertain operation. In his discussion of ‘transposability of schemas’, Sewell (1992) 
defines schemas as intersubjectively available, virtual procedures that can be applied 
in or extended to a variety of contexts. They are virtual because they “cannot be 
reduced to their existence in any particular practice or any particular location in place 
and time”. It is unpredictable, however, what will happen if a schema is actually 
transposed, that is, applied in an unfamiliar case. In other words, one cannot know in 
advance, before trying, whether experiences obtained in one situation will fit to 
another. 
While Sewell does not propose a theoretical explanation for the unpredictability of 
what transposition will produce, the illustrations he offers are quite clear: A joke told 
to a new audience, an investment made in a new market, an offer of marriage made to 
a new patriline. In the terms used above, we would say that it is unpredictable how 
‘external’ signs will be interpreted and judged by the various groups or stakeholders 
involved in a concrete situation1. Thus, the argument from ‘situated knowledge’ bridges 
the gap between individual and collective (or interactive) conceptions of knowledge 
and experience. 
This line of argument to establish the importance of direct experience provides us 
with concepts that allow for a more straightforward argument. For a concrete actor, be 
it a person or a group, direct experience (or self-acquired knowledge) is well 
understood and justified as compared to knowledge from indirect experience. Since 
direct experience links knowledge to sensory perception and social encounter, it may 
support an actor’s sense of having control. Direct experience, moreover, has not been a 
subject of generalization and transposition which are operations that, inevitably, imply 
(some) elimination of detail and of justification context. Both reasons apply to 
‘players’, those who participate in a simulation, as well as to observers, that is, those 
who are present in the simulation without being part of it in a strict sense. 
                                              
1  While the examples listed in the text are easy to understand in terms of different interpretations 
and judgements by different groups, Sewell gives also examples that seem more difficult to 
understand in these terms, e.g. a cavalry attack made on a new terrain, a crop planted in a newly 
cleared field or in a familiar field in a new spring. Such examples raise the question of ‘objective’ or 
‘natural’ causes, and as such are a subject of debate between ‘constructivism’ and ‘realism’. For the 
line of argument in the present text, it is not necessary to go into this debate. The dynamics of social 
processes can be studied without making reference to ‘objective causes’, a statement that does not mean 
to deny that the actors involved in the process often will make such references. 
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If indeed direct experience is required to get an impression of what transposing an 
idea, plan, or schema may bring about (which is Sewell’s translation of Giddens’s 
concept of ‘rule’, one of the two elements that - according to Giddens - constitute 
structure) policy makers face a problem. While acquiring experience in the course of 
designing and implementing policy, policy makers have to make choices, use 
strategies, or adopt a way of conduct. However, after a period of time (in which the 
direction of the process and the results it produced have become apparent), these 
choices, strategies, or way of conduct may be seen as less than adequate. But then, it 
may well be viewed impossible to revert (or undo) the process, because others have 
invested in it, because time has run out, because the costs of reverting are considered 
too high, or simply because relationships are disturbed anyway.  
Experimentation in the field may solve the problem, but not solve it completely. 
Policy experiments, pilot projects, trial periods, can be used to gain experience before 
large-scale introduction of a new policy arrangement is decided upon. But what works 
in Athens may not work in Rome, which is a concise way to say that the outcomes of 
transposing experimental results may not be fully predictable. Some (‘top’) decision 
makers have direct experience from the experiments, which they can rely on when 
introducing new arrangements outside the experimental setting, but for those not 
having participated in the experiments these are others’ experiences in the above 
sense.  
This is one problem of experimentation in the field. Another problem, also 
important, concerns the pilot itself. If useful lessons can be learned from 
experimentation in a pilot, the pilot itself may not take full advantage. A pilot is a 
place where anything may happen that makes policy renewal cumbersome, and with 
no actor being experienced enough to facilitate the process. Of course, much more can 
be said about pilots, for instance that participants may find it encouraging that they are 
‘making the future’, or that they don’t have to comply with a model developed 
elsewhere. And being a pilot often involves also an element of self selection, related to 
the presence of urgent policy issues or to already ongoing attempts to create new 
arrangements. Still, that cannot take away that the very site of experimentation may 
not benefit fully from the experiences it allows for, because of the reasons indicated 
above (less than adequate choices or strategies, impossibility to revert or undo the 
process). 
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Social simulation, used for ex ante assessment of new policy (including reform of 
administrative structure), is a method to overcome these drawbacks of experimentation 
in the field (or at least to mitigate the consequences). Participation in a social 
simulation, or even observation, enables an actor to gain direct experience of change 
processes to evolve, in an artificial setting instead of a real experimentation site. (For a 
discussion of uses of simulation in public administration research, see Vissers, Heyne 
& Peters 1995). We will elucidate this claim by explicating what is meant by the term 
social simulation, and by describing the application of social simulation in a concrete 
case.  
For proper comparison between social simulation and field experiment it must be 
added that the advantages of social simulation - in terms of direct experience, but also 
in terms of experimenting with strategies for change (Van der Meer 1998) - are often 
balanced, in the case of social simulation, by the problem of having to transfer 
experience and findings from an artificial to a real life situation . 
The case we will discuss is the process of creating a town province in the region of 
Rotterdam, or more accurately, the implementation of organizational and legal 
arrangements made for that. This case is relevant for present purposes since the 
creation of a Rotterdam town province can be considered an exemplar of the problem 
of being a pilot. The process of creating a town province will be presented first, 
followed by a picture of the simulation model designed for exploring Rotterdam town 
province implementation processes, and a report of findings from two tests of the 
simulation.  
4.  Rotterdam town province, a brief history 
In the plan to create a Rotterdam town province, arisen around 1990, some 
important developments in public administration in The Netherlands came together. 
One was the ongoing debate about a proper balance between national, local, and 
intermediate (‘provincial’) government. Initially, the debate focused on the distance 
between local and provincial government, that was believed to be too large. The 
disorderly pattern of interlocal and regional forms of cooperation - the ‘administrative 
patchwork’ - was seen as a direct result of this large distance. This lack of order and 
orchestration, in turn, was supposed to produce obscurity, inefficiencies, and poor 
prospects of democratic control. Over the years many proposals were made to resolve 
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the issue, but none found sufficient support. Some proposals involved the suggestion 
to create a new, fourth administrative layer to fill the gap between local and provincial 
government, but these were vetoed by central government, which kept holding to ‘the 
main structure’, comprising a national, a provincial, and a local level of government, 
that was installed in the middle of the 19th Century. 
In the 1960s, the four largest cities began to emphasize the specific metropolitan 
problems they had to cope with. Initially, they focused on financial issues, but later on 
attention shifted to issues like reconstruction of the inner city, minorities, 
unemployment, traffic congestion, and public safety. The cities insisted that they were 
lacking the necessary means (legal, territorial, financial) to deal with this package of 
problems.  
A decade of parliamentary discussion followed, eventually resulting in the so-called 
‘BoN-process’: ‘Administrating at an adequate level’, in Dutch, ‘Besturen op Niveau’ 
(see Koppenjan 1993, Schaap 1997). Central government allowed seven ‘metropolitan 
junctions’ to start the processes of regional administrative reform they considered 
necessary. One of these junctions was Rotterdam.  
At that point in time, Rotterdam (the town and its surroundings) already had a 
remarkable history of reform. Between 1964 and 1986 an administrative layer had 
been existing between local and provincial government (Berveling, Van Dam, Neelen 
& Wille 1996). This ‘Public Body Rynmond’ suffered from lack of internal balance 
because the city of Rotterdam was larger - in terms of both population size and 
economic importance - than the other municipalities involved together.  
Now the ‘BoN process’ made a fresh start possible, one that was welcomed by many 
government officials in the city of Rotterdam. In their view a town province in the 
Rotterdam area, as a new plan was soon to be designated, would solve two problems. 
One was that Rotterdam was too small, the other that it was too large. The surrounding 
municipalities accepted the plan to create a town province, though some of them 
mainly because they believed that annexation would be the most likely alternative. 
The first problem mentioned was that Rotterdam was too small. The city had (and 
still has) a vital economic function for the whole country. Yet there were important 
policy domains where it had to rely on neighbouring towns’ willingness to cooperate, 
in particular with respect to public management of harbor and docklands and to public 
housing. Dependence of this kind was seen as hampering the ‘forceful and integrated 
administration’ considered necessary in view of Rotterdam’s ‘mainport function’. But 
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incorporation of the surrounding municipalities, the obvious solution at first sight, 
might not be achievable. The municipalities would fiercefully resist such a measure 
that would, moreover, produce a town that was too large to fit in the administrative 
landscape in the Netherlands.  
But in another respect, Rotterdam was already also too large as it was. In the mid 
1980s, an attempt was made to reduce the distance between city council and citizens 
by installing district administrations that took over several municipal tasks. These 
district administrations had (and have) no solid legal basis - and no democratic 
legitimation - because central government did not accept further administrative layers, 
as indicated. As a result, the district administrations had to resign to a somewhat 
marginal position in the city’s administrative system.  
Both problems would be solved by the creation of a town province, that is a new 
province enclosing the city of Rotterdam and 17 surrounding municipalities. Part of 
the plan was that the city of Rotterdam was to be split up into a number of new, 
autonomous municipalities. Creating such new municipalities in the area of Rotterdam 
would solve the problem of district administrations’ lack of legal status, and it would 
prevent the new province from being dominated by a single large city.  
To ensure ‘forceful and integrated administration’ at the regional level, quite some 
responsibilities of municipal authorities would have to be transferred to the new 
provincial authority, in particular those concerning public management of the harbor 
and its surroundings (including future extensions) and the centre of the ‘old’ city of 
Rotterdam. Especially this change in the balance of power between municipal and 
provincial authorities was highly remarkable. In Dutch public administration of, say, 
the last two centuries, there is no other example of such a strong province. Still it 
seemed that the plan would be accepted by key actors like Parliament, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the Province of South Holland (which was to be halved if the plan was 
carried out), and the municipalities involved.  
A spanner was thrown in the works, however. In a referendum in Rotterdam (June 
7, 1995) the plan was rejected by 86% of the voters. This referendum had no legally 
binding status, for constitutional law in The Netherlands did not provide for a 
referendum, neither for legislative nor for ‘corrective’ purposes. Still, the results of the 
referendum created an important political fact (Toonen 1998). It showed that the plan 
to create a town province was not supported by Rotterdam citizens. Different 
interpretations were made of this lack of support. Was the referendum result to be 
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taken as a rejection of the plan to create a town province, or was the plan ‘only’ voted 
down because citizens objected to the splitting up of the city of Rotterdam? These 
were important questions as the referendum has been attended by 42% of the 
electorate. Before, the city council had declared to accept the outcome if the 
referendum was attended by at least 36% of the electorate. 
The present chapter discusses the prospects of social simulation for ex ante 
assessment of administrative reform. The process toward a Rotterdam town province 
serves as an empirical case. This process need not be described in full. (For a 
discussion of the referendum, the preceding process, and subsequent developments, 
see Van Dam, Berveling, Neelen & Wille 1996, Flierman, Hagelstein, Pröpper & 
Zaaijer 1997, Schaap 1997, Toonen 1998).  
We became involved in the process in the autumn of 1993, a year and a half before 
the referendum was held. By that time, few reckoned with the possibility that the 
process might not be carried through. Especially those who felt directly responsible for 
guiding the process seemed immersed in preparing the final text of the special 
Rotterdam Town Province Act (commonly referred to as Lex Specialis), thus 
illustrating Janis & Mann’s (1977) supposition that people are often able to think 
open-minded for a prolonged period, but begin to process information in an 
increasingly selective (Janis & Mann would say ‘biased’) way as they move to a final 
decision. 
The Lex Specialis was drafted because parts of the standard legislation concerning 
provinces and municipalities had to be set aside in order to give the future ‘strong’ 
province a firm basis. Of course various actors tried to influence the drafting process, 
and of course these steering attempts were not always in the same direction. Major 
actors were the ‘Consultative Body Rynmond’ (CBR) that represented all 
municipalities in the region, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Important topics of 
discussion were the number of new municipalities to replace the city of Rotterdam 
(CBR wanted at least ten, the Ministry five or six), and the exact powers that the new 
provincial authority would be given.  
As mentioned, responsibilities of municipal authorities would be transferred to the 
provincial authority. The question was: how many, and which ones. Discussion soon 
concentrated on the issue of a general ‘indicative power’ for the provincial authority. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs was rather unwilling to accept such a general power, 
viewing it as a departure from the rules that were existing between municipalities and 
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provinces elsewhere. CBR, in contrast, considered the granting of this power as 
imperative, arguing that the province had to be able to intervene if in the future one or 
more municipalities would act against the interest of the town province as a whole. 
This viewpoint was defended most forcefully by the city of Rotterdam. The other 
municipalities participating in CBR rather sought to secure municipal autonomy under 
a ‘strong’ provincial regime. In most if not all documents concerning the creation of a 
town province, a phrase returns that suggests these contrasting interests to be very 
carefully considered and balanced: “local what can be done locally, regional what 
must be done regionally”. 
It sounds like an incantation. The plan to create a strong town province and to split 
up the city of Rotterdam originated from Rotterdam political and administrative 
authorities and from officials of CBR. The phrase “local what can be done locally, 
regional what must be done regionally” may well have been used (by Rotterdam) to 
reassure the other municipalities, thus keeping them aboard.  
5.  Questions to be answered by social simulation 
While Rotterdam authorities were quite sure that a town province would be 
accomplished, they worried about possible repercussions of splitting up Rotterdam for 
the city itself. Was a ‘Rotterdam identity’ likely to be preserved, and would it be used 
as a basis for future intermunicipal cooperation? Would the new municipalities to be 
created in the Rotterdam area be willing to cooperate in ways that reflected a sense of 
shared history? Would they seek to preserve and extend urban cohesion, or would they 
rather pursue their own interests? And if they would seek to foster urban cohesion, 
what were relevant conditions? Since the formation of a ‘town province’ was without 
precedent, it was very difficult to predict the administrative processes and relations to 
develop.  
We were asked by the ‘Project Bureau Regionalization’ of the city of Rotterdam to 
develop a simulation on intermunicipal cooperation in the future town province2. We 
suggested the Project Bureau to simulate the transformation process itself, arguing that 
implementation of large-scale administrative reform seldom fully corresponds to the 
initial plan. The reason is that actors involved in a change process may react in 
                                              
2  Next to the authors, Co Engberts participated in the research for and design of the simulation. 
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unanticipated ways (Vissers 1994, 1998), ‘using’ their repertoires and perceptions to 
react to plans, measures, or whatever incentive. These repertoires and perceptions 
differ between actors (Van der Meer 1999), and so do reactions. It is the interplay of 
different reactions that makes development processes difficult to predict. We 
suggested to focus the simulation to be made on the transformation process since we 
expected this process to influence profoundly the future relations and administrative 
practices in the town province. 
The Project Bureau, however, was first of all interested in using simulation as an 
instrument that would contribute to adapting, refining, and enlarging Lex Specialis - 
which the Bureau viewed as a sufficient, if not the only way to assure intermunicipal 
cooperation. Thus we were asked to concentrate on the situation that the plan was 
operative, that is, a situation in which there is a town province under the regime of Lex 
Specialis. In particular, the simulation to be designed should answer questions like: 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
what types of intermunicipal problem will appear, especially between municipalities 
on the territory of the present city of Rotterdam; 
will the instruments of the town province suffice to solve intermunicipal conflict; 
will additional formal or informal arrangements be necessary in order to achieve 
both a forceful regional administration and ‘vital’ local authorities; 
who will take care of the cohesion of the city of Rotterdam; 
who will take responsibility when typical metropolitan problems arise that transcend 
the borders of the future municipalities. 
 
A simulation that was designed to answer these questions could still contribute to 
the transformation process, in the sense that officials who were to function in the town 
province would be given the possibility to experience the new situation before entering 
it. Thus, the objectives of the simulation project can be summarized as development 
and utilization of a simulation depicting (the structural administrative aspects of) the 
future town province, in order to investigate the relational and behavioral patterns 
that may be typical of the future situation (research objective), and to support the 
transformation process by providing participants with ex ante experience about the 
future situation (development objective). 
From these objectives and from the picture of polycentric policy making given 
earlier (which includes administrative processes), we derived three sets of design 
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criteria, concerning structural arrangements, complexity and heterogeneity of 
administrative processes, and contents of the simulation3. 
Structural arrangements 
The objectives formulated above require first of all that the simulation to be 
designed must have an initial situation in which the town province has already come 
into being. More specifically, this means that a ‘strong’ province is present, as well as 
several autonomous municipalities (a number of these replacing a former large city). 
Both provincial and municipal authorities have to deal with a system of legal 
arrangements - an abridged version of relevant parts of the draft of Lex Specialis. We 
took this draft as a starting point, not because we believed it to offer a correct 
representation of what was actually to be put into practice, but because we were (and 
the Project Bureau was) interested in the potential dynamics of these anticipated 
arrangements. 
Here it must be noted that no ‘real life’ institutional setting consists only of formal, 
judicial elements. We had to make assumptions about further organizational or 
institutional patterns the transformation process would give rise to. An example is 
what would happen with the municipal service organizations of Rotterdam. Partly 
relying on interviews with a variety of ‘stakeholders’ within Rotterdam (see below), 
conducted before we started to design the simulation, we supposed that some service 
agencies would be split up and linked to the new municipalities while other agencies 
would remain intact in a more independent mode, having contracts with different 
municipalities. Note that this holds for the beginning of the simulation. Such initial 
conditions can be changed by participants in a simulation, if so desired by them. 
Representation of policy and administrative processes 
Polycentric policy networks tend to be complex and heterogeneous (Rhodes & 
Marsh 1992, Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997). Many actors may be involved and 
between them a variety of connections may have developed. A simulation of 
interadministrative processes must allow such a variety to be reproduced, in ways that 
                                              
3  For a general discussion of feasibility and performability as design criteria, see Van der Meer 
(1983). 
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make sense to those involved in the real life situation referred to. For a simulation to 
meet these requirements, the following design criteria apply: 
– 
– 
– 
the simulation should allow a variety of repertoires to exist, so that processes may 
evolve that reflect real life interadministrative and intermunicipal communication; 
the ‘contents’ of these repertoires should reflect important themes and 
preoccupations of (groups of) relevant actors in real life; 
the simulation should introduce or encourage relational patterns that reflect real life 
policy network patterns. 
 
A simulation that meets these criteria (in addition to the structural arrangements 
mentioned) may be used to explore the dynamics of administrative arrangements in the 
future town province. For these criteria to be met, empirical information is needed 
about real life repertoires and network patterns. 
In the town province case, collection of such information was difficult since we 
were dealing with a situation that did not yet exist. In fact, this was a further reason to 
prefer a simulation of the transformation process. When an already formed future 
situation has to be simulated, it is more difficult to decide which patterns and 
repertoires will have to be present in the simulation, for such a decision presupposes 
knowledge of a transformation process that has not taken place already.  
In the case of social simulation, this problem is mitigated by the fact that repertoires 
as such do not have to be defined in advance. Repertoires reflect actors’ personal 
histories and present positions (Van der Meer, Schaap & Van Twist 1992, Van der 
Meer 1999), so they are generated, reproduced and changed by actors. The design 
question to be answered, therefore, is not what relevant repertoires will look like, but 
what histories and structural positions should be present in the simulation design. 
This is why we studied the course of discussion on the town province, and in 
particular the relating perceptions and expectations of various actors: officials of the 
municipality of Rotterdam, managers of municipal services, officials of several district 
administrations within Rotterdam. We also made an inventory of social, cultural and 
economic characteristics of some sub-areas and municipalities within the future town 
province, and a list of issues on a range of policy domains that seemed likely to show 
up, especially issues that may - from one perspective or another - require 
interadministrative coordination (Van der Meer, Engberts & Vissers 1994a).  
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Using these elements we designed a simulation that comprised dependencies (often, 
but not always mutual dependencies), resource differences, and other incentives that 
might encourage repertoire development in ways relevant to the question at hand. We 
emphasize once more that the development of diverse repertoires not only depends on 
characteristics of the simulation setting, but also on participants’ backgrounds (their 
‘repertoires ex ante’). Below, we will elaborate on this point. 
Content criteria 
Next to design criteria concerning structure and process, a simulation has to offer 
plausible contents, in the sense of adequate selection of policy domains and issues, and 
also in the sense that participants in (and observers of) the simulation must be able to 
view and experience the simulation as real. In Raser’s (1969) formulation of process 
validity: “Perhaps all that is required is that the structure seems realistic to the players, 
that it conforms to their ideas as to what constitutes reality, not that it accurately reflect 
what is actually ‘out there’.” 
Raser’s suggestion is valuable, yet it is not easy to follow because actors in a 
polycentric policy network may disagree - perhaps even sharply disagree - about what 
seems realistic. And what is more, the Project Bureau (which had asked us to design 
the simulation) was part of the network.  
The Project Bureau had perceptions, problem definitions, and desires concerning 
‘the real situation’, and expectations and demands concerning the future town province 
(and thus concerning the representation of it in a social simulation) that differed from 
those of other relevant actors, as our exploration of perceptions and expectations held 
by other actors within Rotterdam made clear.  
As mentioned, the Project Bureau was primarily interested in a simulation that could 
be used to identify shortcomings in the formal arrangements relating to the future town 
province. For that purpose, the simulation would have to demonstrate the functioning 
of intermunicipal cooperation and coordination in policy areas like public order and 
public services. About other areas such as environmental planning and infrastructure 
the Project Bureau seemed less uncertain. However, in the interviews we conducted, 
we found that these latter policy areas were viewed as greatly important and 
problematic by many officials, especially by those at the sub municipal level. 
Moreover, we found that the nature of a policy issue was often all but obvious. For 
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example, when a road is scheduled in an allotment area, is this an issue of 
infrastructure, of recreation, of quality of living conditions?  
Thus we faced a dilemma in simulation design. For reasons of validity, various 
perspectives had to be present in the simulation, but the simulation also had to be 
accepted by the Project Bureau as a relevant contribution to the reform process - which 
implied that problems had to be formulated in terms compatible with the Project 
Bureau’s repertoire. 
We decided that it was necessary to include issues that allowed for a diversity of 
interpretations. We thought, and still think, that it is not possible to build a valid 
simulation on a single, well-defined issue or policy area. The Project Bureau members 
acknowledged this, but were unwilling to accept the consequence that the simulation 
might focus on problems they did not view as realistic or that they did not see as 
relevant. They insisted that provisions were made that would guarantee the simulation 
to produce the phenomena they considered relevant. The risks involved in making 
such provisions: 
– 
– 
– 
that participants experience ‘unnatural’ limitations in the simulation, which may 
lead to reactions to the simulation model replacing reactions to its subject matter; 
that other actors come to see the simulation setting or its result as unrealistic; 
that the dynamics and results of the simulation will be invalid and hence that wrong 
conclusions may be drawn. 
 
Despite these risks, the Project Bureau preferred the simulation to be designed 
around a single issue, public order, and to be very simple furthermore. Eventually, a 
certain plurality of issues was agreed upon. With respect to degree of complexity it 
was decided to discuss the matter after one or two tests had been conducted. 
The Project Bureau was not convinced by the tests, it turned out, still viewing the 
degree of complexity as too high, and the phenomena in the simulation as too general 
and therefore not realistic enough. We tend to see these two points of critique as 
difficult to combine, since we think that specific and ‘real’ processes will only emerge 
under sufficiently complex, ‘socially rich’ circumstances. 
The Project Bureau decided that the simulation would not be used for the purpose of 
exploring intermunicipal cooperation in the future town province under the regime of 
Lex Specialis, but that it could be used for development purposes during the transition 
process. This decision was facilitated by the fact that, at the time of the second test, the 
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draft law was adapted: The Ministry of Home Affairs had come to accept that the 
Province Authority was given additional instruments to handle intermunicipal conflict, 
which came close to the general ‘indicative power’ that the City of Rotterdam (and the 
Project Bureau) had sought to achieve. 
6.  Simulation design 
In the literature on simulation & gaming methodology there is a tendency to 
emphasize the way the simulation setting is modelled (e.g. Duke 1983). The approach 
we followed to design a simulation of the future Rotterdam town province, however, 
focused on the interplay of setting and person (see Bass & Firestone 1980). Thus we 
concurred with Geurts & Van Wierst (1991), who suggest to concentrate on ‘game-in-
use’ rather than on ‘game-in-the-box’. According to these authors, a definition of 
‘simulation game’ that also includes playing itself is preferable to a definition that is 
confined to the set of instruction books and other materials necessary for play. 
Setting design 
In line with the criteria and choices discussed above we developed a social 
simulation, called ‘Polis’ after the town province existing in it. In the simulation, the 
town province enclosed four municipalities, three of which used to be parts of a former 
large city. Next to these five administrations there was an Information and 
Consultation Agency (ICA) that could be engaged by administrative authorities for 
research or advice. Each of these six groups consisted of four or five participants. 
Within each administration, a distinction was made between political functions (Royal 
Commissioner and Provincial Executives, Mayor and Aldermen) and civil servants 
(one mainly responsible for finances, another for town and country planning).  
Selection of participants 
In relation to participants, a first design question concerns selection (who are to be 
participants, what selection criteria must be applied), and a second question is whether 
the simulation is performable (doable) for a given group of participants. If a simulation 
is designed for a specific group of participants (e.g. for training or organization 
development purposes, see Peters, Vissers & Van der Meer 1998), only performability 
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has to be paid attention to. But in other, more research oriented cases, selecting and 
preparing participants is a major design element. 
As stated already, one way of introducing relevant repertoires in a simulation is the 
selection of participants. Participants bring along their repertoires, the cognitive result 
of their personal history and their present social positions. These repertoires will be 
used to make perceive what is going on in the simulation setting and act accordingly. 
Therefore, the pattern of repertoires and relations to develop in a simulation reflects 
the culture of a group of participants (Van der Meer 1983, Vissers 1994, 1998). If 
elements of a relevant cultural context can be specified in advance, and when the 
people sustaining that culture can be identified, careful selection of a specific sample 
of participants may help to create a relevant simulation. 
In the Rotterdam case it was surmized that the culture(s) of already existing 
administrations were an important factor in the sense-making and construction 
processes that were to shape administrative practices of the new town province. It was 
therefore decided to carry out the simulation experiments mainly with participants 
from existing administrations.  
Performability of a simulation depends on a number of conditions, of which we 
mention ‘paper economy’ and ‘psychological reality’ in particular. ‘Paper economy’ 
means the requirement that participants must be able to perform relevant tasks and 
activities without lengthy preparation. Even when the simulation setting is ‘economic’ 
or ‘simple’ in this sense, participants will often experience a considerable degree of 
complexity, because of time pressure and because complexity may emanate from 
interaction about seemingly simple issues. In the simulation we introduced only four 
municipalities (in reality 27 were planned), we described for each of them the initial 
situation in only a few pages, we devised simple procedures, simple financial 
arrangements, etc.  
‘Psychological reality’ denotes the requirement that participants must be able, 
individually and collectively, to make sense of the situation in which they find 
themselves. In particular, they must be able to recognize the simulation setting, and 
take it as an approximation of reality. No formula can be given to make sure that a 
simulation setting will indeed be perceived and treated as such an approximation. But 
what can be done is to offer a setting that is appealing to participants - by introducing 
concepts, themes, and problems that make sense to them (as gathered from field 
research) and that are still ‘open’ enough to prompt action or incite discussion. 
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Preparing the simulation 
Before the simulation was started, participants received materials about simulation 
in general, about the design of ‘Polis’ (initial situation, history, communication rules, 
time schedule), and about legal arrangements that were operative ‘in the recently 
formed town province’ (materials are described in Van der Meer, Engberts & Vissers 
1994b). Participants were given a position in the initial situation (random assignment), 
and they received materials relating to the position given to them. This ‘specific 
instruction’ included: 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
history, and an outline of present characteristics of own corporation (province, 
town, or service agency); 
existing plans (province: integrated strategic plan; municipality: zoning plan) 
local regulations; 
budgets, including estimates for the years to come; 
an official document containing some urgent policy issues (municipality). 
 
A very important point concerns the goals to be pursued in the simulation: 
Participants were asked to pursue their own objectives and ideals, thereby using the 
position given to them as a starting point. They could develop their own strategies, 
make agreements, create new formal or informal arrangements, etc. Only two 
limitations applied: a ‘year’ would last 80 minutes, and communication between 
groups in the simulation was somewhat restricted (only free telephonic and written 
communication, other communication on request).  
In addition to these limitations (or ‘boundary conditions’), participants would face 
restrictions that arose from other actors’ behaviours. For instance, a change attempt 
undertaken by one participant in a social simulation will have implications for other 
participants. Such implications are not limited to ‘tangible effects’ like new structures 
or new procedures. A change attempt may also have an impact on ongoing processes 
in the simulation: participants are enrolled or refuse to be so, priorities have to be 
articulated, relations or even groups may become redefined, and so forth.  
More or less similar implications may follow from measures, questions, comments, 
and other ‘inputs’ from various ‘outside world actors’ (represented by the facilitator of 
the simulation). Several types of such ‘inputs’ can be distinguished. A first type of 
input is given with the information in the initial situation. A second type is introduced 
during the simulation and consists of issues raised, questions asked, proposals made by 
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‘outside world actors’ (residents’ associations, business companies, public welfare 
services, property developers). These first two types are made in advance, and 
introduced according to a fixed schedule (concerning type two, without participants 
being informed about this before). Inputs had been devised in an attempt to make the 
intended cooperation and coordination issues appear, but note that such inputs, like 
any action or arrangement, do not determine the reactions to follow. (Van der Meer, 
Engberts & Vissers (1994b) provide a list of inputs.) 
Outside world actors may react to participants’ decisions (or the failure of these to 
appear), or may be asked, by authorities or officials in the simulation, to reply to 
announcements, questions, or proposals (in written form). In these cases too, the 
facilitator would represent ‘outside world actors’, in such a way that 
interadministrative cooperation would return to participants as a question that they had 
to address.  
7.  Findings from two tests 
The simulation was designed to explore whether and how actors in the Rotterdam 
region, municipalities in particular, would cooperate under the regime of Lex 
Specialis. Two tests were conducted for the sake of inspecting the simulation’s 
performability, validity and relevance in more or less technical terms. Participants in 
these tests were mainly employed by the Rotterdam City Hall or by district 
administrations; these participants were inclined to support the coming of a Rotterdam 
Town Province (in their real life role as municipal or sub municipal officials). 
We will not report here on the topics of performability and validity (see Van der 
Meer, Engbert & Vissers 1994b). Rather we will discuss some significant features of 
administrative reform we found in the two tests.  
 
Images 
In the simulation, a clear and sometimes sharp difference existed between groups’ 
self images and the images they held of other groups. (The word ‘groups’ is used here 
as a shortcut for participants forming a municipality or another actor in the 
simulation.) For instance, the province was viewed by the other groups as rather 
passive, even though the province tried to stimulate intermunicipal cooperation by 
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endorsing municipal initiatives rather than by resorting to a top down course of action 
(first simulation), or by creating funds to support municipal projects (second 
simulation). Such endeavours in spite, in both simulations provincial authorities came 
increasingly under attack from other groups, mainly because municipal authorities felt 
that it was a provincial responsibility to steer and to offer a clear framework for their 
own policy making. But provincial authorities were also, and sometimes in one breath, 
criticized for too assertively pursuing a policy of their own. 
Relational patterns 
Between municipalities, there were surprisingly few bilateral contacts. In the first 
simulation, municipalities engaged in multilateral negotiations about the foundation of 
the financial allocation model. Soon these talks dissolved, which is remarkable in view 
of the image of a passive province. Apparently, municipalities kept focusing on the 
province, regardless its supposed passivity. The second simulation showed a similar 
pattern. 
In both simulations the province was involved in most of the consultations. In the 
first simulation, two regular consultations appeared. A first consultation involved the 
Royal Commissioner and the mayors. Here, discussion was mainly concentrating on 
the preferable kind of consultation between Royal Commissioner and mayors. 
Conclusions tended towards: securing progress, making sure that policy contents will 
be discussed by the assigned officials, and supervision of policy processes. Its 
procedural objective did not prevent the first consultation from recurrent substantial 
debate, which means overlap with the second regular consultation, that of the officials 
who were responsible for town and country planning (portfolio holders). 
Discussion topics 
In the first simulation, the commissioner and the mayors discussed two 
encompassing subjects - next to more occasional topics. One was the foundation of the 
financial allocation model. Some mayors blocked a plan according to which the 
province would draft a proposal on the basis of municipalities’ desiderata. In their 
view, this plan would give the province too much power. The commissioner then 
invited the municipalities to present a joint proposal. These talks did not lead to a final 
conclusion. The second subject was regional priority setting. After extensive 
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discussion it was decided that each municipality would submit two key problems, 
which happened to result in eight regional key problems. 
In the second simulation too, portfolio holders devoted lengthy discussion to a list 
of key problems. Here, an interesting question arose: To what degree can 
municipalities be allowed to talk about each others’ key problems, and to what degree 
a key problem of one town could be solved, at least in part, by developments in 
another town? Discussing these questions appeared to be difficult, not to mention 
answering them.  
Also in the second simulation, most of the interadministrative discussions took place 
within structures already present by the start of the simulation, or developed right after 
the start. In most of these consultations the provincial delegate was able to determine 
the kind of consultation (usually this meant generating inventories or information, 
especially for the purpose of provincial policy formation). Although the province was 
increasingly criticized for not being communicative enough, few attempts were made 
to reshape existing or to create new types of consultation. This had also been the case 
in the first simulation. Noticeably, a completely new form of communication was 
developed in the second simulation: the emission of (many) ‘press reports’. However, 
these press reports did hardly contribute to the ‘regular’ consultations. 
8.  Discussion: What can be learned from social simulation? 
From the observations made above a number of more general insights can be 
derived that may elucidate the prospects of social simulation for administrative change 
processes. 
First, the simulation offered participants (and observers) impressions and experience 
relating to a possible, and not unlikely, shape of the future town province. While 
noticeable differences can be found between the tests (which is in agreement with the 
contention that social simulation cannot be used to predict detailed outcomes of a 
change process), the experiences and impressions a social simulation provides may 
help actors to anticipate future effects. If these effects are undesirable, early 
recognition may encourage actors to consider alternative courses of action.  
The practices to emerge in both simulations did not match the expectations the 
majority of participants said to have about the real town province. If so, important 
questions are why and how the actual shape of the town province emerged as it did in 
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the simulation, and whether the process can be made a subject of steering. Let us 
discuss some further observations: 
Second, the tests suggest that general social mechanisms play a role in 
administrative reform. An example, already mentioned, is the formation of images of 
other groups. Partly on the basis of evaluative discussions (held after the simulation 
itself had come to an end) we found that the formation of images is often based on 
presumptions about other actors’ ‘strategic’ behaviours, rather than on information 
about (or originating from) these other actors. Some participants ascribed this to a 
culture of officials that is widespread in the realm of public administration. Others 
blamed the simulation. Still others viewed presumptions about ‘strategic’ behaviour an 
almost inevitable aspect of interaction between equal partners, positing that precisely 
for this reason a strong higher level authority is necessary. Now, the evaluative 
sessions revealed that participants’ intentions were often far less ‘strategic’ than 
presumed by others. Thus, the simulation suggests that many interadministrative 
behaviours are guided by (often untested, sometimes wrong) presuppositions about 
other actors’ intentions and about what is ‘rational’ in a given context. Understanding 
such mechanisms may help to achieve more open and constructive communication in 
‘real life’. 
Third, the tests confirmed that ‘only’ structural rearrangement is unlikely to produce 
desired behavioral outcomes (see Vissers 1994). For example, an important reason to 
create a town province was the strengthening of regional administration. Local 
administrations may and often will pursue local interests, thus acting in a way that is 
inconsistent with ‘general interest’, and it was considered imperative to have an 
authority that, if necessary, could force municipalities to act according to the general 
interest. Lex Specialis would give province authorities the power to protect the general 
interest. In the simulation such a strong province (in terms of formal power) was 
present, but nevertheless in both tests local interests dominated the scene. Provincial 
authorities made efforts to protect what they viewed as ‘the general interest’. They 
encouraged cooperation in order to avoid ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situations produced by 
‘strategic’ behaviours, but these efforts were rejected, obstructed, or simply ignored by 
others. This is noticeable and even distressing since not just a few participants said to 
be aware of this prisoner’s dilemma character of many interadministrative issues in 
‘real life’, and believed that a strong town province is needed to overcome the 
problem.  
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The combination of formal arrangements and individual convictions could not 
prevent or suppress NIMBY-like (‘not in my back yard’) behaviors, it was concluded 
in the evaluative sessions. The interplay of new structure and ‘old’ administrative 
culture seemed to reproduce many of the problems of the old situation. Moreover it 
was found that central authorities face practical limitations when trying to use the legal 
instruments they possess. Thus, more attention may have to be paid to cultural 
transformation if new administrative arrangements are to function properly.  
Fourth, knowledgeable experimentation and strategy development may be very 
helpful with respect to transformation processes. Here, the potential of social 
simulation to provide a connection between polycentric policy theory and guidelines 
for policy actors is conspicuous. Discussion with simulation participants may offer a 
starting point for developing strategies to be used in the transformation process, or 
even a starting point for developing strategies to be used in the preceding process of 
preparing structural and cultural transformation. In addition, social simulation can be 
used to assess these strategies. 
In summary, in this chapter we have attempted to show that social simulation is a 
useful instrument to enhance awareness and understanding of processes of reform in 
polycentric policy-making networks. Social simulation may contribute to the 
understanding of repertoires and patterns of behavior of the actors involved in the 
network, to explore process dynamics (Van der Meer & Geurts 1995), and to make an 
ex ante assessment of intended policy measures.  
In addition to this contribution to ‘knowledge acquisition’, social simulation can be 
used for ‘knowledge application’: for strategy formation and for experimentation with 
‘modes of behaviour’. Social simulation means, above all, that a setting is provided in 
which participants can develop and test ideas and behaviours, discuss and adapt these, 
and test them again.  
Going through the insights we presented, one can observe a shift from learning what 
the new situation will be like, via learning why and how, to learning that relates to 
constructive design of a new situation. In a sense this final point is not fully 
compatible with the first. Administrative practices and patterns, rather than being 
dictated by formal regulations, are the outcome of social construction processes. Legal 
and other formal arrangements can be one of the factors to guide the process, and so 
are the intentions and actions of policy makers. Social simulation reveals the impact of 
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these and various other factors, and allows them to be explored, elaborated, and tested 
in further ‘runs’. 
For these reasons, social simulation has the potential to improve processes of 
administrative reform. This is particularly so when simulation is not used as in an 
isolated way, but instead is taken up in the wider process of policy making. 
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